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RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS
NORVIE L. LAYt
The sixth amendment to the United States Construction expressly
guarantees that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . .
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Irrespective of what the
draftsmen of this amendment may have had in mind at the time of its
promulgation and ratification, it now appears settled that every person

accused of at least a serious crime is entitled to the services of an
attorney during his trial regardless of his financial ability to engage
legal counsel.' No longer does the right to such assistance depend
upon any distinction between the accused being charged with a capital
as opposed to a non-capital offense.' Neither is the right to counsel
limited to the trial itself for the amendment speaks of the right of the
accused to "the assistance of counsel for his defense." Realizing that
this right might be meaningless if counsel were denied until the trial,
the Supreme Court has held that there are other steps in the judicial
process that are just as critical, if not more critical, to the defense of
the accused as the trial itself. Hence, right to counsel may be a requisite
to the validity of some pre-trial stages such as the arraignment' and
the preliminary hearing.' The implication appears to be that unless a
defendant is afforded the right to counsel at these pre-trial procedures,
he might be denied effective representation by counsel at the only
stage of the legal proceedings when legal services are of any material
benefit.5 It is at these earlier stages when legal assistance might help
the accused the most.
Furthermore, the fifth amendment provides that no person "shall
be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." It is
possible that this guarantee should and does include the right to be
informed specifically of the right to secure the services of counsel
before the accused can validly waive his rights under this amendment.
In short, how can an individual intelligently waive a right or privilege
that he does not know he has?

I

Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville.

1. Gideon v. Wainvright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. For a discussion of this previously existing distinction with regard to the
obligation of the state to furnish counsel, see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)
and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
3. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
4. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
5. Cf. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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The purpose of this paper is to explore the applicability of the
fifth and sixth amendments to criminal tax investigations, in order to
ascertain when the investigation in fact becomes criminal in nature.
ESCOBEDO AND MIRANDA

The right to legal representation at each step of the proceedings
after there has been a formal indictment or accusation is no longer
sufficient. However thoroughly the landmark cases of Escobedo v.
Illinois and Miranda v. Arizona have been treated, a reexamination
may be fruitful in order to determine specifically the extent of their
applicability to criminal tax investigations.
In Escobedo the defendant was arrested and taken to police
headquarters where, although no formal charge had been lodged
against him, he was interrogated in connection with a homicide. During
the interrogation, throughout which the defendant repeatedly asked
to talk with his lawyer but was denied the opportunity, he made damaging statements to the police which were subsequently admitted at
the trial. In reversing the conviction, the United States Supreme
Court held that where:
. . . the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police
carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested
and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute
constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been
denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution . . . and that no statement

elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used
against him at a criminal trial.8
In other words, "when the process shifts from investigatory to
accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to
elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate"' and the
accused is then entitled to consult with his attorney.
In Miranda the defendant was questioned while in police custody
without being given, at the beginning of the interrogation, an adequate
warning as to his Constitutional rights. Here again, admissions were
6. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
9. Id. 492.
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extracted and were admitted into evidence at the trial. Unlike Escobedo
there was no request for an attorney, but in overturning the conviction,
the Court hastened to point out that such a request on the part of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to his right to counsel. While a request
would give him an affirmative right to legal assistance, his failure to
do so will not be construed as a waiver. In fact, there can be no effective
waiver unless made after the accused has been informed of his right to
counsel: "the accused who does not know his rights and therefore
does not make a request may be the person who most needs counsel." 1
The Court held further "that an individual held for interrogation
must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer
and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation. .

.""

Such a

warning was deemed to be an absolute requirement to a valid interrogation. The Court then added:
The principles announced today deal with the protection
which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. It is at this
point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in some countries. Under the system
of warnings we delineate today or under any other system
which may be devised and found effective, the safeguards to
be erected about the privilege must come into play at this
point."
The Court, in reality, included the right to counsel, as well as the
right to be so advised, as one of the safeguards against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment; it did not rely solely upon the sixth
amendment. This factor may prove to be extremely significant when
applied to tax investigations.
APPLICABILITY OF EsCOBEDo AND MIRANDA TO CRIMINAL
TAX INVESTIGATIONS

Court of Appeals Decisions
Kolzatsu v. United States 3 was one of the first cases in which a
defendant sought to apply the principles of Escobedo to a tax investiga10.
11.
12.
13.

384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).
Id. 471.
Id. 477.
351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).
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tion. The preliminary investigation began in 1960 when the taxpayer's income tax return for the taxable year 1958 was assigned to a
revenue agent for audit. Periodic meetings were held between the
agent and the taxpayer over the following year, and, during this period
of time, the taxpayer turned over various bookkeeping records and
other related material to the agent. In August of 1961, the investigation was referred to a special agent from the Intelligence Division
of the Internal Revenue Service. The investigation was referred to
another special agent in late 1961 and he continued the investigation
without further meetings with the taxpayer until May of 1963. The
special agent testified that he informed the taxpayer of his Constitutional rights at their meeting in May of 1963 and told him that he could
refuse to say anything or refuse to produce any records which might
tend to incriminate him. On the other hand, the taxpayer testified that
it was in August of 1963 when he first discovered that he was being
investigated with the possibility of criminal prosecution.
The taxpayer conceded that an agent has the right to interrogate
a taxpayer and to examine his books and records for the purpose of
ascertaining his correct civil liability. He then argued, however, that
such an interrogation "undergoes a fundamental change when (1) a
revenue agent discovers facts indicating substantial unreported income,
and (2) the facts are such that the revenue agent suspects fraud."' 4
When this occurs, the taxpayer asserted, the investigation has begun to
focus on a particular suspect and as of that date the agents have a duty
to tell the taxpayer, in specific and understandable terms, of his
right to counsel.
The Government argued, however, that it was the agent's duty to
examine the taxpayer's returns to determine his tax liability for civil
purposes. Furthermore, it claimed that it was the duty of the special
agent to investigate any alleged violations and to recommend some
course of action as a result of this investigation. Under this view,
both agents were merely involved in investigative activities with the
consequent result that the accusatorial stage of the proceedings had
not been reached during any of this investigation.
The court, feeling that the taxpayer had taken the phrase "focus
on a particular suspect" out of context and that Escobedo was inapplicable, refused to accept the taxpayer's contentions. Whereas in
Escobedo there was an unsolved crime and the accused had been
arrested, in the case at bar "the essential question to be determined
by the investigations of the revenue agents was whether in fact any
14. Id. 900.
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crime had been committed."' The taxpayer had neither been indicted
nor arrested. Escobedo was thus distinguished without any discussion as
to when it might be appropriate to extend its guarantees to tax investigations.
On the precise facts before the court, one can hardly dispute the
finding that this was not the exact factual pattern presented by
Escobedo inasmuch as the taxpayer had neither specifically requested
and been denied counsel nor was in custody during these investigations.
However, the taxpayer's assertion that the emphasis shifted from a
routine civil tax investigation and began to focus on a particular
suspect when facts were discovered which led the agent to believe that
some fraud had been committed deserves some attention. At what point
in time does a tax investigation reach the accusatorial stage? Is it after
the last record and document has been examined, the taxpayer has
been thoroughly questioned, and an indictment has been returned?
While the decision in Kohatszu does not go this far, such a result might
logically be implied since the court did hold that none of the activities
of the agents had moved the proceedings to the accusatory level. What
then was left except the formal accusation or indictment? If the taxpayer has not been adequately advised of his right to counsel prior to
the date the agents have finished their investigations, it may be entirely prior to the date the agents have finished their investigations, it
may be entirely too late for legal assistance to be of any real value.
By this time the taxpayer may have divulged much damaging information which he had a right to withhold and which any competent
counsel would have advised him to withhold. If this is true, has he not
been denied his right to counsel prior to the time any indictment is
returned or a formal charge lodged ?1"
It would appear that when the revenue agent has discovered
certain facts and has obtained information that lead him to infer that
there is a possibility of a criminal violation and, acting upon this
information, turns over the files to the Intelligence Division the whole
process then begins to move toward the accusatorial stage. This does
not mean that the entire proceeding then becomes accusatory nor that
the accusatory stage has necessarily been reached. It merely shows the
direction in which the investigation is moving. It does seem obvious,
however, that the process becomes accusatory at some point prior to a
formal accusation. Somewhere in the investigatory process the special
agent secures additional facts which lead him to recommend a prosecution
15. Id. 901.

16. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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for a criminal violation

of the tax laws.

Perhaps this comes

only after he has completed his examination and investigation but
this is immaterial since he is certainly making no general inquiry.
He has some reason for suspecting the commission of a criminal offense
or he would discontinue his investigation; he has a suspect in mind who
must be the taxpayer under investigation. Therefore, unless a method is
devised to measure the subjective intent of the special agent, the taxpayer's
right to counsel should attach at the time the Intelligence Division begins
its investigation or after a formal accusation has been made. The former is
preferable. Otherwise, valuable rights may have been lost in the interim.
But whatever the merits of such a rule, the Ninth Circuit did not so hold.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed its view in a per
curiam opinion and ruled that statements made by a taxpayer to a
special agent should be admissible, even though he had not been
informed of his right to legal assistance." In so holding, the court
adhered to its decision in Kohatsu on the assumption that the proceedings had not moved to the accusatorial stage.
The Fifth Circuit recently had occasion to face the same issue in
Mathis v. United States. 8 The taxpayer was incarcerated in the
Florida State Penitentiary on a completely unrelated offense when he
was first contacted by a revenue agent who sought to verify the
correctness of the taxpayer's signature on a tax return. He admitted
the signature as his own and signed the appropriate form extending
the period of limitations thus giving the Government additional time
to pursue their investigation. The same procedure was subsequently followed for the tax return for another year. After two or three interviews,
the matter was referred to the Intelligence Division. Thereafter a special
agent, accompanied by the original interviewing agent, called upon
the taxpayer. At the outset of this interview, the taxpayer was informed
of his Constitutional right to refrain from self-incrimination and, after
having been so advised, he refused any further cooperation. Over the
taxpayer's objection, the Government introduced the documents which
he had executed during the first two interviews.
In appealing, the defendant, relying heavily upon the fact that
throughout the entire investigation there was a possibility that criminal
charges might later be instituted and that he was incarcerated at the
time the interviews were conducted, placed his argument squarely
17. Rickey v. United States, 360 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835

(1966).
18. 369 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1967).
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upon Miranda. Taking the taxpayer's first contention, the court held
that the mere fact that there was a possibility that criminal actions
might subsequently be brought was not sufficient to convert a routine
civil tax investigation into a general inquiry concerning some unsolved
crime. This is a valid point when it is remembered that any admissions
by the taxpayer were made at a time antedating the referral of the case
to the Intelligence Division. At this stage the agent was truly involved
in a routine civil investigation. While his investigation might uncover
additional facts that would lead to a referral to the Intelligence
Division, he was still predominantly concerned with the civil aspects
of the case. Hence, the inquiry had not begun to narrow at the time
the taxpayer voluntarily admitted his signature and signed the documents. Notwithstanding this, the court did acknowledge that it was
possible to look at the taxpayer, from the very outset of the investigation, as the only suspect and that this undoubtedly would confuse the
distinction between the investigative and accusatorial steps of the
proceedings; this sounds more like Escobedo than Miranda. While
this may be true, it was still a civil investigation when the incriminating evidence was given.
With regard to the taxpayer's incarceration for an unconnected
offense, the court held that this in and of itself was insufficient to
bring the case under the Miranda decision. Miranda spoke in terms of
custodial interrogation and defined it as questioning initiated by a law
enforcement official after a person has been arrested or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in some material way. The court
construed this language to mean some form of incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere. While this may be a
limitation that was never intended by Miranda the fact remains that
any questioning done here was at a time when the issue was one of
civil liability. As soon as the special agent was involved, the taxpayer
was informed of his Constitutional rights although the case contains no
statement with regard to the details of the warning.
Assuming that the statements and waivers had been given to the
special agent and that the taxpayer had not been told of his rights, it
would appear immaterial whether or not he was incarcerated on some
other offense. He would still be in custody with a substantial deprivation of his freedom of action. He could not leave. Granted, he migbt
ask the special agent to leave but there would be little reason to suppose
that he knew that he possessed this right unless he was expressly
advised of it by the agent. Even if he thought that it was in his power
to make such a request, he might decline to take such a course of
action, not because of any fear of physical harm but because of a

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
psychological fear that he would only be hurting his case. On the other
hand, if he was fully informed of his right to counsel, he might not
hesitate to refuse to disclose this information.
On the precise facts, this case seems to be somewhat easier to
decide than Kolatsu since any statements made here were made to the
agent conducting the civil investigation and the taxpayer was informed
of least some of his Constitutional rights whereas in Kohatsu the
giving of notice by the agent was a controverted fact.
One interesting sidelight of both Mathis and Kohatsu deserves
further comment. In both cases the agent who had been conducting the
civil investigation accompanied the special agent when he was first
introduced to the taxpayer. It is extremely doubtful that the average
taxpayer has even the vaguest conception of the structural hierarchy
of the Internal Revenue Service. He has little if any reason to know
that some criminal conduct is suspected and is about to be investigated
further unless he is told in clear and unmistakable terms. He is far
more likely to think that this is just another agent. Any introduction
prefaced by the title special agent will probably be lost upon him
unless he has been through the process before. It would also appear
that the Service is trying to make such a distinction to the taxpayer
since in both Kohatsu and Mathis the special agents testified that they
informed the taxpayer of his Constitutional rights when they first met
with him. If the distinction is to be given any real significance, why
not be specific so that the taxpayer will understand? This possible
confusion on the part of the taxpayer is even more reason to inform
him fully of his right to counsel as soon as the Intelligence Division
begins its investigation.
The First Circuit has agreed with the Fifth and Ninth that a
taxpayer does not have to be warned of his right to counsel when he
goes to the office of the Internal Revenue Service to discuss his
income tax returns."9
In a cursory opinion, the court held Miranda
inapplicable because of the lack of custodial interrogation. The taxpayer was, according to the court, free to walk out at any time.
The exact nature of the investigation, i.e., whether it was being
conducted by the Intelligence Division or by the revenue agent, was
not set forth. If it was at a time before a special agent became involved,
the position of the court was correct because it was still a civil investigation. However, if it was no longer purely civil in nature, the opinion
is subject to the same criticism as that expressed above with regard to
the holdings of the other two circuits. Nevertheless, one comment by the
19. Morgan v. United States, 377 F.2d 507 (lst Cir. 1967).
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court is particularly distressing. While not in response to an assertion
by the taxpayer, the court theorized that if the Government had an
obligation to inform the taxpayer that he was entitled to counsel, it
would have to furnish one if he could not afford to hire an attorney.
Thus, the court opened Pandora's box to some supposed horrors. It is
unlikely that the average taxpayer would be so financially destitute
that he could not afford counsel of his own choosing if he in fact
wanted legal assistance after the warning. Even if such were the case,
it is certainly no justification for denying him his Constitutional rights.
The court concluded that to some extent individuals had to be prepared
to look after themselves. This may be true but if it is a criminal tax
investigation, then the taxpayer should be given the necessary admonition that he may in fact rationally "look after himself" by employing
counsel. How can one begin to watch out for himself unless he reasonably appreciates the dangers that he is supposed to avoid.2"
DistrictCourt Cases
As might be expected the United States district courts have had
this question before them more frequently than have the courts of
appeal. One of the first to be heard after Escobedo involved a factual
situation somewhat different from the cases discussed above. 2 ' The
taxpayer had engaged an attorney who was present at some of the
conferences with the auditing agent. At no time did the agent raise the
issue as to whether or not the lawyer had a power of attorney or a
treasury card which was then required under certain circumstances
to represent a taxpayer in the proceedings with the Internal Revenue
Service. The case was subsequently referred to the Intelligence Division
because the agent felt that there were indications of fraud. The special
agent was told of the taxpayer's retention of counsel. Thereafter,
both agents called upon the taxpayer at his studio (he was an artist)
without notifying him in advance. They failed to offer any intelligent
reason for failure to call in advance, and the reason given for failure
to notify the lawyer was that he had no power of attorney. The taxpayer
was told that the role of the special agent "was to investigate and
determine whether certain of petitioner's returns were fraudulent and
whether criminal prosecution appeared to be warranted."2 2 He was
20. The First Circuit recently affirmed its holding in Morgan in Schlinsky v.
United States, 379 F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1967), and held that any statements made by the
taxpayer after the special agent had informed him that he need not answer any
questions nor produce any records that might tend to incriminate him were voluntary.
Again the taxpayer had not specifically been told of his right to counsel.
21. Bohrod v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Wis. 1965).
22. Id. 561.
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also told that he could take the fifth amendment if he felt that any
of the questions tended to incriminate him.
The evidence concerning the absence of the taxpayer's attorney
is in conflict. The taxpayer alleged that he told the agents that he felt
his attorney should be present, whereupon the special agent said that it
was not important to have an attorney present since he intended to ask
questions of "historical" background and that the lawyer would be of
no assistance. The taxpayer further alleged that he was told that his
lawyer would be of no assistance. The taxpayer further alleged that he
was told that his lawyer could not assist since he had neither a power of
attorney nor a treasury card. The special agent testified that he told
the taxpayer that, if he so desired, his attorney could be present, that
petitioner said it was unnecessary, and the discussion about the lack of
a treasury card and power of attorney did not take place until the
session was completed.
The court refused the taxpayer's petition to enjoin, on the ground
that his right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated, the
use of the evidence obtained at the conference. While conceding that
the investigation had begun to focus on a particular suspect, the court
went on to add that at this stage it was still uncertain as to whether
or not a crime had been committed. Escobedo was thus distinguished.
Recognizing that Escobedo might be construed so as to fix the time at
which the Constitutional right to counsel attaches at a point of arrest,
the court felt that in order to do so "the circumstances must be far more
compelling than these."23 It went on to add that "[t]o fix that point,
chronologically, at the moment when a criminal investigator joins a
civil investigator in a tax case is too stringently to inhibit the search
for the truth and too heavily to burden law enforcement."2" This last
statement is particularly strong and in one respect rather unfortunate.
If the court means that legal assistance at this stage of the investigation
would tend to obscure the truth, this would appear to be an indictment
of the legal profession on the assumption that an attorney would
deliberately conceal the truth or wilfully mislead the agents. The
soundness of any such assumption is untenable. On the other hand, if
the court intended to refer to the obvious fact that a taxpayer without
legal counsel is far more likely to divulge damaging information which
he had a Constitutional right to refuse to disclose, then is not this even
more reason that right to counsel should be afforded at this stage of
the proceedings. Let the truth be obtained but let it be disclosed or
23. Id. 565.
24. Id. 566.
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uncovered with the safeguards and guarantees to which the individual
is entitled.
The court then approached the problem from the standpoint of
the taxpayer's rights under the fifth amendment which, unlike the
sixth, was held to be operative during the interview at the studio. The
court noted that the "presence or absence of counsel is a factor to be
considered in determining whether waiver of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is voluntary and intelligent"
and that "[t] his overlapping of the concept of the right to counsel and
the concept of the privilege against self-incrimination runs through the
cases."2 Even if the truth of the statements attributed to the special
agent were to be assumed, the court held that the taxpayer had not
proven that he had not voluntarily waived his rights under the fifth
amendment. The reasoning was as follows: if the taxpayer refrained
from calling his lawyer because the special agent had told him that the
questions were of a historical nature, then he could reasonably be
expected to refuse to answer or to have called his attorney when he
was asked questions that he recognized as non-historical, and that even
if the special agent had told him that his attorney could not be of any
assistance if present, it might reasonably be inferred that he would have
contacted his attorney to see if this statement were true. Is there any
more reason to assume that the taxpayer would call his attorney to
verify the agent's statements than that the special agent would suggest
that the taxpayer engage an attorney who possessed a treasury card? Is
there any more reason to infer that the taxpayer would refuse to
answer non-historical questions than that he would probably recognize
no distinction in the questions being asked?
Continuing, the court stated that even if it is assumed that the
taxpayer did not call his attorney because of the agent's statements, it
could not be assumed that the attorney would have advised him not to
have talked or that the taxpayer would have followed the tactical
advice that might have been offered by the attorney. These failures
to make assumptions as to what the taxpayer or his attorney would
have done are not germane. The question is not whether the attorney
would have given any particular advice nor whether the client would
have followed it. The issue is whether the failure to have his attorney
present led the taxpayer to make statements without realizing their
significance, i.e., did the absence of his attorney prevent him from
making an intelligent waiver of his Constitutional rights under the
25. Id. 567.
26. Id. This is very similar
in Mj.'anda.

to the

Supreme Court's

subsequent holding
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fifth amendment.
Furthermore, the failure to make these assumptions is conspicious
when viewed in light of the court's willingness to assume that the taxpayer would refuse to answer any non-historical questions or that he
would have refused to proceed without calling his attorney if the
statements attributed to the special agent had in fact been made. Why
make these assumptions if unwilling to assume that the taxpayer would
have refused to answer additional questions if he had in fact had
counsel?
Although the taxpayer was not refused an opportunity to see his
attorney as was the defendant in Escobedo, the impact could very well
be the same if the agent's statements reasonably led him to believe
either that his attorney was not needed or that he would be unable to
assist if present. The net result is the same, i.e., benefit of counsel has
been denied in both instances because of some conduct on the part of
the investigating authorities.
In ruling that the taxpayer's right to counsel under the sixth
amendment had not attached at the time of the interview in question,
the court stated that "to fix that point-geographically, psychologically,
and sociologically-in the studio for a 55 year old, educated artistin-residence and faculty member of a university is to fix it too far
from the vital center of civil liability.

'2 7

This implies that a well

educated man has less need of legal counsel in the earlier stages of
the proceedings than one of lesser education. This is irrelevant when
the education of an individual is not even remotely connected with the
legal process. The fact that the taxpayer was in familiar surroundings
moves the case away from the Escobedo type of investigation or
interrogation but there seems to be little justification for equating or
drawing an analogy between a well educated individual and the right
to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. If it had any
relevance at all, it would be in determining whether or not the taxpayer
had made an intelligent waiver of his rights under the fifth amendment
but the court never mentioned his education in this connection.
In light of some of the court's statements concerning the fear that
right to counsel at the time the Intelligence Division enters the investigation might inhibit the search for truth, perhaps it would be well to
recall another portion of Escobedo where Mr. Justice Goldberg commented that:
. . . no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if
it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the
27. Id. 566.
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citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have to
fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer,
he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the
excercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness
of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very
wrong with that system.2"
One of the first cases, involving the right to counsel in tax
investigations, to be decided by a district court after the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Miranda was United States v.
2" Again the
Fiore.
facts are essentially the same as those discussed
above: the taxpayer was first questioned by an agent at his home and
then by a special agent in the office of his accountant. The taxpayer
moved to suppress the evidence thus acquired on the grounds that the
agents were guilty of deception when the investigation became an
inquiry into a possible criminal violation and that they failed to warn
him of his Constitutional rights at that time. The taxpayer was advised
of his right to refuse to respond to any questions, make any statements,
produce any documents or give any information which might tend to
incriminate him under federal law. However, he was not told of his
right to counsel.
The taxpayer contended that Escobedo was applciable because of
the nature of the investigation and because he had not been told that
the function of a special agent was to interview him for possible
criminal infractions. The court started with the assumption that
Escobedo could have no possible application prior to the meeting with
the special agent "for it is plain that if the accusatorial stage was not
reached when this inquiry became unquestionably an investigation
solely directed to possible criminal conduct, then, a fortiori, it did not
become accusatorial at any preceding stage."3 Admitting that there
may be certain aspects of a criminal tax investigation that make it
similar to other criminal investigations, the court felt that there was
one compelling difference: the ordinary criminal investigation begins
with the independent fact that a crime has been committed and then
begins to project "a ring of evidence large enough to bring the suspect
within its circle."'" The process of general inquiry then "gradually
pulls the suspect toward the center of all evidence until investigation
28.
29.
30.
31.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S., 478, 490 (1964).
258 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
Id. 439.
Id. 440.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ultimately begins to focus upon him."

2

This differs from a tax

investigation since at the very outset the taxpayer stands in the middle
of the inquiry as the only possible suspect while "as invetsigation
proceeds, the ring of evidence expands and builds around him."33
Hence, the court felt that any distinction between the investigative and
accusatorial stages might not be entirely apposite in tax investigations.
This seems unwarranted. If in fact the defendant is the only possible
suspect and the revenue agents are investigating and interrogating him
for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether he has committed a
criminal offense, has not the entire process already reached the
accusatory level albeit he has not yet been charged with a crime? Is
the accusatorial stage of the proceedings negated by the mere fact that
n specific crime has been pinpointed? While Escobedo may not be
entirely applicable to this case, it is doubtful that it can be interpreted
in such a fashion as to permit the denial of counsel until the investigating authorities have determined by independent sources that a crime
has in fact been committed. Consider the situation in which a person
has been missing for a considerable period of time and the police pick
up an individual who apparently was the last one to see the missing
person. At this stage can the individual be interrogated at will without
benefit of counsel? Can it be said that no Constitutional rights exist
until there is absolute proof that a crime has been committed? It is
granted that this illustration may not be analogous to the investigation
of a taxpayer, but it serves to show that the court was placing too
narrow an interpretation on Escobedo by indicating that the accusatorial stage should not be presumed until a crime has in fact been
perpetrated and the investigators have independent knowledge thereof.
The court went on to hold that any question as to the right to
counsel that might have been left open by Escobedo was answered
negatively in Miranda by the use of the words "custodial interrogation." The use "of this term throughout the opinion and the prefacing
of the decision with a lengthy recital of police abuses leaves no doubt
as to what situations the Court had in mind in reaching its decision.""4
While the Court was unwilling to characterize the agents' calls as
being pleasant, they did not resemble custodial interrogation.
Two comments are in order at this point. First, it is hard to justify
any interpretation which concludes that Miranda placed restrictions
upon Escobedo. While the Court in Miranda did refer to "custodial
interrogation" throughout the opinion, it should be kept in mind that
32. Id.
33. Id.

34. Id.
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the defendant in Escobedo had been denied an opportunity to consult
with his attorney after repeated requests to this effect, whereas in
Miranda the defendant was not fully informed of his Constitutional
right to counsel. To this writer Miranda was an extension of the safeguards set forth in Escobedo and not a restriction. Secondly, it is
common practice for the Supreme Court to decide only the specific
question before it without elaborating on all of the other factual
situations in which the same or similar questions might be legitimately
raised. Even if the court felt that this was not a proper case for the
application of Miranda, it is still dubious to restrict Miranda to
purely custodial interrogation cases.
Three months after the decision in Fiore, the same question was
presented to another district court." With regard to the visit by the
agent first assigned to the case, the court found that he "was not
conducting a criminal investigation and did not made any determination as to whether or not a fraudulent or willful evasion had occurred."
He merely "followed customary Internal Revenue Service
practice and referred the matter to the Intelligence Division for
further investigation as to the cause of the understatement which
he found."a?
The case was thereafter assigned to a special agent who conducted
the investigation that eventually led to the taxpayer's indictment. Here,
as in most of the other cases, the taxpayer was informed that he need
not produce any records or documents nor make any statements that
might tend to incriminate him but he was not told of this right to
counsel. He was also told that the agent would leave if asked. It was
held that the defendant's rights had not been violated under either
Escobedo or Miranda "it being clear that the defendant was at no
time when interviewed at his own store in custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in any significant way."3 The taxpayer
"was never interviewed by the agents except in the familiar surroundings of his own store, and I rule that he acted voluntarily in all of his
dealings with the agents, free from any of the compulsive
factors adverted to in the Mirandaopinion."
While the taxpayer was not in custody, was interviewed in his
own store, and was told that the agent would leave if he were asked to,
does it automatically follow that he was not deprived of his freedom in
35.

United States v. Schlinsky, 261 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1966), aff'd, 379

F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1967).
36. Id. 267.
37. Id.
38. Id. 268.
39. Id.
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any signigicant way? What could he do? He could have asked the agent
to leave but it is extremely doubtful that the average taxpayer would
take this avenue of approach. He might fear that the agent would
retaliate in some manner or that such conduct might lead the agent to
suspect that he was attempting to hide something. Without being
specifically advised of his right to counsel, the taxpayer might also
fear that the placing of a call to an attorney might produce the same
suspicions in the agent. Whether or not every taxpayer would have
these thoughts cross his mind is clearly unknown. However, the
possibilities are so, obvious that they could very well induce him to
produce various records and make certain statements which he would
refuse to make if he had more time to reflect upon the possible
consequences or if he had the assistance of counsel.
While the court stressed the familiarity of the taxpayer's surroundings during the interview and the fact that he could have asked
the agent to leave and concluded that his freedom had not been
significantly affected, it never mentioned another salient feature of
Miranda; the Supreme Court also spoke in terms of psychologically
as opposed to physically-oriented interrogation." While it is granted
that Miranda was concerned with in-custody interrogation, it is possible
for the average taxpayer to feel psychologically as if he were actually
in custody. If so, the effect would be the same irrespective of his
actual freedom of movement. Hence, acting under these conditions, it
might be impossible for him to appreciate the significance of his
right to refuse to make incriminating statements. In other words, an
intelligent waiver could not be made under this handicap. Advising
him of his right to counsel would greatly alleviate the burden of establishing that the taxpayer knew the significance of his actions.
In any event, it was encouraging to see the court make the
distinction between investigations made before and after the special
agent became involved in the case. This certainly is a move away from
the holding of the Ninth Circuit in Kohatsu4 ' where it was held that
none of the activities by either the original agent or the special agent
had moved the proceedings from the investigative to the accusatory level.
While not deciding that right to counsel attaches when the special agent
becomes involved, the case at bar does not expressly rule it out in
42
appropriate situations.
40. 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).
41. 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).

42. At least one other district court has held that Miranda is inapplicable where
it was not alleged that the taxpayer "was, or even approached being, in custody."
Stern v. Robinson, 262 F. Supp. 13, 15 (W.D. Tenn. 1966). However, this case is not
of the importance of those discussed above since there was no specific allegation that
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One of the later cases to be decided in this area and one which
may prove significant is United States v. Kingry.43 The court granted
the taxpayer's motion to suppress the evidence that was obtained by a
special agent who did not advise the taxpayer of his right to counsel.
The court quickly noted that there was no indication that anyone
connected with the case had done anything other than what the law had
required for several years. Nevertheless, the law had been affected by
the decision of the Supreme Court in Miranda and the judge felt that
the principles enunciated therein were applicable to the present controversy and that the district court was bound by the decision in
Miranda.
It was brought out on examination of the special agent that he
had told the taxpayer of his right to remain silent but not of his right
to counsel nor that the function of a special agent is to determine
whether or not a criminal offense has been committed. After eliciting
this information, the taxpayer's attorney, basing his motion on
Mrhanda, moved to suppress the statements given at the interview. In
the ensuing discussion, counsel for the Government sought to distinguish Miranda on the basis that the special agent had no specific
knowledge that a crime had been committed, but the court felt that the
question was not so much what the agent had in mind but what warning
he gave the taxpayer. In trying to resolve the issue as to when the point
was reached when the taxpayer should be fully informed of his
Constitutional rights, the Government conceded that by the time the
agents had completed the investigation and had decided that there was
fraud involved, the taxpayer must be advised if he is subsequently
arrested or interviewed again. Here again, the crucial issue is raised.
If the right attaches only after the agent has secured enough information to warrant an arrest, then undoubtedly the attorney will be of less
assistance than if he had been present at the earlier stages. On the
other hand, if he has a right to counsel when he is interviewed after the
agent has concluded that a violation has been committed, then this
right would be completely dependent upon the competence of the
special agent and his subjective intent.
The court then asked counsel for the Government to explain the
difference between an income tax case and a bank robbery case.
Being unsatisfied with the explanation given, the court answered its
own question by stating that in either of them the defendant could
be incarcerated if found guilty. It then concluded that this was the
any of the statements given were made after the fraud investigation began. This
removes it from the realm of this discussion.
43. 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,604,-F. Supp.-(N.D. Fla. 1967).
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philosophy of Miranda and whether or not the Government agreed was
not material. The court felt bound by it. Thus for the first time an
argument was successfully made that the philosophy of Escobedo and
Miranda should be the determinative feature irrespective of whether
or -not the case at bar was identical in all respects to the factual
situations in those two cases.
Apparently the decision in favor of the taxpayer was triggered
by the belief that when the special agent began his investigation, he had
a suspect in mind and the sole purpose of the investigation was to
ascertain if in fact this individual had committed a criminal offense.
Therefore, the right to counsel should attach at that time.
In light of the effect that this decision will have on the investigatory procedures now employed by the Internal Revenue Service, it
seems probable that the Government will appeal the decision. The
precise issue has not been before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit; the most similar case which this court has decided was Matlis
v. United States," discussed above, where the statements were made
during the civil part of the investigation. Should the Fifth Circuit
affirm, there would be a conflict with the holding of the Ninth Circuit
in KohatsY 5 and perhaps the Supreme Court would agree to hear the
case in order to resolve the conflict.
Shortly after the Florida case, the same issue was raised again,
this time before the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois.46 The taxpayer was not told of the criminal nature
of the investigation until some eighteen months after the case had been
transferred to the Intelligence Division. During this interval, the
defendant had made various 'statements to the special agent and had
allowed the Service full access to all of his records even to the extent
of permitting their removal to the Service offices for inspection and
copying. At no time was the defendant told of his Constitutional rights.
In suppressing the use of certain evidence secured during the
investigation by the Intelligence Division, the court held that once the
taxpayer becomes the subject of a criminal tax investigation, the
adversary process of criminal justice has been directed against him
as a potential criminal defendant. At this juncture he is entitled to the
services of counsel and must be informed of such right. The investigation became criminal in nature the instant the case was transferred to
the Intelligence Division inasmuch as the jurisdiction of that Division
44. 369 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1967).
45. 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).
46. United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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is limited to criminal investigations. Thus, Escobedo would be applicable at that time.
The court based its decision partly upon Miranda; it held that
the test as to whether or not a suspect has voluntarily waived his
constitutional rights depends upon his knowledge of these rights. How
can an individual waive something until he knows that he possesses
it? Whether a suspect is induced to give incriminating evidence
through a combination of ignorance of his Constitutional rights and
the coercive atmosphere of custody or through ignorance of his rights
coupled with the inference that the investigation is simply to ascertain
the exact amount of tax liability, the result is the same. In both, the
party under investigation may involuntarily incriminate himself. The
court felt that in some respects the tax investigation may even be more
misleading than custodial interrogation since the suspect who has been
taken into custody knows that his interrogators are seeking evidence
to convict him whereas the tax suspect is permitted or may even be
encouraged to think that no criminal prosecution is anticipated.
Referring to Miranda and B~cobedo, the court felt that the
essence of these cases centers around the inception of the adversary
process. Miranda should not be so narrowly construed as to limit its
application to custodial interrogations. An entire reading of this case
indicates otherwise. The right to refrain from self-incrimination should
begin when the investigation becomes criminal in nature irrespective
of whether or not the suspect is in custody or whether or not he knows
that he is being investigated for possible criminal prosecution.
This case may have been somewhat easier to decide than some of
the earlier cases since the taxpayer was not told of any of his Constitutional rights when the investigation was transferred to the Intelligence Division. Nevertheless, the court specifically took issue with the
decision of the Ninth Circuit in Kohafsu47 where it was held that the
process had not become accusatory when the Intelligence Division
became involved. It was deemed irrelevant whether the culprit is
known before the crime or the crime before the individual who
committed it. In either case, the investigator is trying to secure enough
evidence to obtain a criminal prosecution and conviction. Hence
Escobedo, as well as Miranda, is applicable when the Intelligence
Division enters the picture.
The court did not specifically hold that its decision was based
upon the fifth or sixth amendment but it dealt primarily with the
question of whether or not the statements were voluntarily given, thus
47. 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966).
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making the right to counsel one of the factors to be considered in
ascertaining if the taxpayer voluntarily and knowledgeably made a
waiver of his right to refuse self-incrimination under the fifth amendment.
The possibility of the Supreme Court resolving the issue is
heightened by this case inasmuch as the Seventh Circuit has never
decided the question and it would appear likely that the Service will
appeal. Thus, it seems inevitable that another conflict will arise
between circuits.
CONCLUSION

While the decisions in Escobedo and Miranda may not specifically apply to tax investigations because of the obvious factual differences, the rights sought to be protected in those cases and the
general purpose of these rights indicate that the philosophy expressed
should apply with equal weight to criminal tax matters. It is clear that
they do not, nor were they intended to, cover routine civil tax investigations. It is equally as clear that they do apply to criminal investigations
whenever the process becomes accusatory. When does this occur in a
tax case? Undoubtedly, it has been reached by the time that the
taxpayer has been indicted or formally charged. But the mere fact
that the proceedings are then accusatory does not preclude the conclusion that they earlier reached the accusatorial stage. This would
leave two alternatives: first, the date when the investigation is referred
to and contact is made by the Intelligence Division and, second, the
time when the special agent ascertains that he has enough evidence
to recommend a criminal accusation.
Of these possibilities, waiting until a formal charge has been
lodged is unwise and is undoubtedly unconsititutional. By this time the
investigation may have proceeded to a point where counsel can be of
little assistance and it may have completely passed the point where the
taxpayer needed it the most. Also, it is obvious that the entire process
has become accusatory prior to the formal charge.
If the right attaches at the time when the special agent has
accumulated enough evidence that he intends to recommend prosecution, valuable rights will again have been lost. Furthermore, such a
construction is untenable since it would be impossible to determine
what was the subjective intent of the agent, i.e., when did he decide
to recommend prosecution? This alternative would present an extra
hazard when the special agent is unable to decide whether or not to
recommend prosecution until he has secured all of the necessary
information. Should this occur, the taxpayer would be in no better
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position than he would if the right attached at the time of the formal
accusation; the same objections expressed with regard to that result
would again apply with equal force.
The only workable alternative would, therefore, be that the taxpayer should be informed of his right to legal assistance when the
case is transferred to the Intelligence Division. By this time, the
proceedings are clearly not of a civil nature inasmuch as the function
of the Intelligence Division is to investigate possible criminal violations.
Granted that there is no absolute knowledge that a crime has in fact
been committed, but it is obvious that the revenue agent feels that it
is reasonably possible or he would not have transferred the case to
the Intelligence Division. It is also clear that the taxpayer is the only
suspect and whether or not the nature of the inquiry is such that it
seeks to bring the suspect into the middle of the ring of evidence is
irrelevant.4 8 By the very nature of the proceedings, he is already
there. It merely begins to build around him. Any questions asked of
the taxpayer would be for the express purpose of determining whether
or not he committed the offense which the special agent has reasonable
ground to suspect he has. It is at this stage of the investigation that
legal counsel is most needed. It is here that counsel will enable the
taxpayer to protect his Constitutional right against self-incrimination.
It is here that the whole process begins to focus on one individual.
It is here that the investigation in effect becomes accusatory.
Giving the taxpayer the right to counsel at this stage may at
first seem unnecessary on the assumption that the dealings are with a
sophisticated individual who should know that he could call an attorney
if he so desired. Any such assumption would be totally unwarranted.
The average taxpayer probably has little conception of his Constitutional
rights. His lack of knowledge may in fact be increased when the
special agent tells him of his right.to refuse to answer any questions
or produce any records but specifically refrains from mentioning
counsel. This could easily cause him to infer that no such right exists.
In reality, he probably has less knowledge of his rights than would the
individual being questioned on a more serious charge since this may
be the only contact that the taxpayer has had or ever will have with
an investigative official.
Nor should this produce any great hardship on the Internal
Revenue Service. Irrespective of an actual obligation, it seems to be a
generally accepted pattern that the taxpayer is informed of his right
to refuse to answer any question from or produce any documents for
48. See United States v. Fiore, 258 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
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the special agent. How much longer would it take to inform him of
his right to counsel? If the taxpayer is so informed, he will have more
information on which to base a waiver of his rights if he is so inclined.
Legal assistance, if obtained, might make the work of the Service a
little more difficult in some cases but this is certainly irrelevant. The
Constitutional rights of the taxpayer should precede the desires of
the Internal Revenue Service.
Therefore, it seems obvious that the sixth amendment right to
counsel attaches at the time that the case is transferred to the Intelligence Division for further investigation. The whole process then begins
to center around the accumulation of sufficient evidence to establish
a criminal violation. That is the very reason that the Intelligence
Division has the case. The investigation is no longer purely civil in
nature but rather it has moved to the accusatory stage and, under
Escobedo, the taxpayer should be specifically informed of his right to
counsel at this time. Unless this is done, the sixth amendment will
often afford little protection to the taxpayer. Furthermore, the failure
to inform the party being investigated that he has a right to consult
with an attorney if he so desires raises serious problems about his
ability to understand what his consititutional rights are under the
fifth amendment. Such lack of knowledge could obviously prevent his
making an intelligent waiver of those rights and Miranda should be
applicable notwithstanding the lack of custodial interrogation. The
crucial element is present even without in-custody questioning. To
the taxpayer, his freedom of movement may have been severely restricted by the investigation because of his utter confusion and total
unfamiliarity with the entire process.
It may be prossible to find a few tax investigations where no
rights have been lost because of the failure of the investigating
authorities from the Intelligence Division to inform the taxpayer of
his right to the assistance of couftsel but this would not justify the
witholding of the individual's Constitutional rights. Whether or not the
right to counsel is permitted as a right under the fifth or under the
sixth amendment is not nearly as important as the fact that it whould
be allowed at the inception of the criminal investigation. This is
particularly true where it appears that this is a right to which the
taxpayer is entitled under both amendments.

COMMENTS
The Indiana Law Journal is pleased to announce that, beginning
with a future issue of Volume 43, it will initiate a new section entitled
"COMMENTS." The purpose of this section is to provide a forum for the
expression of timely and thoughtful opinion concerning current legal
and social problems, unfettered by the restrictions of the usual article
format and the need for rigorous documentation. The essence of this
unstructured section will be the presentation of new ideas and approaches with the emphasis on free and imaginative speculation. We welcome for our consideration the COMMENTS of all members of the bar
and all members of law faculties.
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